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Abstract Cognitive scientists have increasingly turned to cultural transmission to
explain the widespread nature of religion. One key hypothesis focuses on memory,
proposing that that minimally counterintuitive (MCI) content facilitates the transmis-
sion of supernatural beliefs. We propose two caveats to this hypothesis. (1) Memory
effects decrease as MCI concepts become commonly used, and (2) people do not
believe counterintuitive content readily; therefore additional mechanisms are required
to get from memory to belief. In experiments 1–3 (n=283), we examined the relation-
ship between MCI, belief, and memory. We found that increased tendencies to anthro-
pomorphize predicted poorer memory for anthropomorphic-MCI content. MCI content
was found less believable than intuitive content, suggesting different mechanisms are
required to explain belief. In experiment 4 (n=70), we examined the non-content-based
cultural learning mechanism of credibility-enhancing displays (CREDs) and found that
it increased participants’ belief in MCI content, suggesting this type of learning can
better explain the transmission of belief.
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One of the more prominent and influential hypotheses in the cognitive science of
religion is minimally counterintuitive (MCI) content (see Atran & Norenzayan 2004a;
Barrett 2004; Boyer 2001; Boyer 2003). This hypothesis suggests that religious
representations are widespread because they are uniquely adapted to exploit the
structures of our minds by violating reliably developing intuitive understandings of
the world (Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001). More specifically, super-
natural content violates our core ontological assumptions of the world. It is therefore
distinctive and more memorable than non-supernatural content. This memory bias
makes religious ideas “stick” and remain in human minds across generations. In this
way, MCI theory is a parsimonious and wide-reaching account of the cultural contagion
of religious beliefs.
Recent developments in the cognitive science of religion have called this hypothesis
into question (Gervais et al. 2011; Henrich 2009; Purzycki & Willard 2015; Russell &
Gobet 2013). One of the early objections is termed the Mickey Mouse problem (Atran
2002; Atran & Norenzayan 2004a). Simply put, if minimal counterintuitiveness is all
that is required for religious concepts to take root, then why is Mickey Mouse, an MCI
concept, not treated as a god? This problem has been broadly reframed as the Zeus
problem: why don’t people readily believe in, and worship, other people’s gods as
much as they do their own gods? Why don’t Christians believe in Zeus (and start
worshipping him), if he has similar MCI properties to the Christian God (Gervais &
Henrich 2010)? The exact same mental representation of a supernatural agent can ignite
faith in some people but only incredulous mirth in others. The MCI hypothesis is silent
about why some MCI content becomes the center of a powerful belief system, whereas
others do not.
Other criticisms have come in the form of the cognitive structures required for MCI
theory to create a unique and persistent memory effect (see Purzycki & Willard 2015).
MCI violations are violations of core ontological categories, or innate intuitions about
how the mind works. This view has been countered with the suggestion that many MCI
violations are schematic rather than ontological in nature (Purzycki 2010; Upal 2010).
Simply put, this would place MCI violations in the “things we find surprising” category
more generally, and not as specific and persistent violations of ontological assumptions.
This would mean that there is no difference between how we process information about
something unusual, like a pink elephant, and something impossible, like an invisible
elephant, other than the degree of surprise we feel. Further, this would suggest that once
MCI ideas are accepted and commonplace, new schemas would be created that
incorporate these ideas. New ideas that are consistent with these schemas will not be
violating any of our expectations and should therefore not show a bias in memory. This
implies that while counterintuitiveness might account for the spread of certain mental
representations, it cannot explain the persistence of supernatural or other religious
beliefs in particular. We will call this perspective the schema or schematic view of
MCI content.
Here, we underline these concerns and provide a partial solution (see Atran &
Henrich 2010; Henrich 2009). We wish to address the issue of belief and distinctiveness
in three hypotheses:
1. We hypothesize that MCI content is not readily believed, and thus it demands
additional mechanisms to prompt belief. Minimal counterintuitiveness may, under
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some conditions, make a concept more memorable, but it consistently makes it less
believable.
2. We further hypothesize that people who more readily engage in the MCI-like
thought processes of anthropomorphism should have an attenuated memory effect
for this type of content. Frequent use should change schemas. This would be
evidence that MCI violations are schematic in nature and that these types of beliefs
can be updated with new experiences and expectations of the world.
3. We hypothesize that non-content-based cultural learning mechanisms can play a
role in overcoming the problem of belief for MCI content. We propose that
exposure to credibility-enhancing displays (Henrich 2009) can instill commitment
to MCI content despite its inherent unbelievability.
What Is MCI?
The MCI hypothesis has played an important role in the cognitive science of religion
(Atran & Norenzayan 2004a; Barrett 2004; Barrett 2008b; Boyer 1994; Boyer 2001;
Boyer 2003). The hypothesis rests on the idea that human minds possess innate or
reliably developing ontological categories governed by core knowledge domains, such
as folk physics, folk biology and folk psychology (see Spelke & Kinzler 2007;
Wellman & Gelman 1992). A concept becomes minimally counterintuitive when an
implicit feature that pertains to one of these categories is mildly but systematically
violated (e.g., an object that can pass through walls), or an implicit feature gets
transferred to an object or animal to which it should not apply (e.g., a statue that knows
your thoughts). These violations are attention-arresting and inferentially rich and
therefore encourage further cognitive processing that facilitates their cognitive stabili-
zation and cultural transmission. However, they are not radical departures from com-
mon sense and do not rupture completely ordinary expectations that would otherwise
render them incomprehensible (Atran & Norenzayan 2004a; Sperber 1996).
What differentiates MCI concepts from ones that are simply bizarre (see Lang 1995;
McDaniel et al. 1995; Riefer & Lamay 1998) is that the violations are about core
ontological categories such as physical object, living form, or person—not just our
learned expectations of the world (Barrett 2008a). It has been argued that violations of
these knowledge domains are surprising to us in a more fundamental way (Barrett &
Nyhof 2001), and we pay more attention to these violations and remember them better
than we do ideas consistent with expectations. The MCI hypothesis asserts that this
increased memorability allows MCI concepts to spread at a greater rate than intuitive
concepts or maximally counterintuitive concepts, leading to a world full of myths and
stories about the supernatural.
Previous Research on the MCI Effect
Two foundational studies established this MCI effect (Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Boyer &
Ramble 2001). Both of these studies used stories that contained sets of intuitive and
MCI items, and found that people remembered more of the MCI items than the intuitive
ones. Norenzayan and colleagues (2006, study 2) analyzed Grimms’ fairytales and
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found that stories with two or three MCI violations (but not more) were the most well-
known. Another showed that the Roman prodigies with minimally counterintuitive
content,1 collected between 218 and 44 BCE, are more likely to be recorded than ones
with only bizarre or intuitive content (Lisdorf 2004).
Other research has looked at the narrative context in which MCI content is presented
(Gonce et al. 2006; Upal 2010; Upal et al. 2007). Their findings suggest that the
memory bias for MCI content is only apparent when the content is not expected. When
stories are prefaced with “In a dream” or presented as science fiction, the memory bias
disappears. This is a potential problem for myths and fairytales, where MCI content
should be expected (Gonce et al. 2006), but it also adds support to a schema view of the
MCI memory effect (Upal 2010). If expecting MCI content means that the content is no
longer surprising and requiring of special attention, then the possibility that MCI
content is driving the spread of these types of cultural information is called into
question.
Distinctiveness and MCI Theory
The first time a person hears that trees can understand and remember their conversa-
tions, clearly they will find this statement distinctive and potentially memorable. Still,
what happens when that person has become well acquainted with this concept? How
would they see it if they had been raised since birth with this as a belief? Humans are
amazingly adaptable to novel concepts and artifacts. Magnets and helium balloons are
“counterintuitive” items we see as commonplace. This problem of declining distinc-
tiveness rests on the tension between whether these concepts exist as unchangeable core
concepts or whether they are part of updatable schemas of the world. This tension has
been addressed in greater detail elsewhere (see Purzycki & Willard 2015).
For the MCI hypothesis to explain the persistence of many supernatural represen-
tations, it has to go beyond a description of what happens when people come in contact
with an unusual idea and account for the persistence of these beliefs over time. A key
question, therefore, is whether the memory bias remains when these ideas become more
schema-consistent, and therefore unlikely to violate expectations of the world.
The Problem of Belief
The fact that people can become deeply and powerful committed to religious concepts
is part of what makes them so intriguing. Though it is clear that not all supernatural
ideas are believed in (consider fairytales), and not all religious traditions hold belief as
the main defining component of religious devotion (Cohen et al. 2003; Purzycki &
Sosis 2011; Shariff et al. 2014), belief still remains a powerful motivating factor for the
way people relate to some core supernatural ideas. The very fact that these concepts are
“counterintuitive” should suggest that they are less believable than our intuitive
perceptions of the world. Nevertheless, people are willing to offer time and resources
to, and possibly even die for, beliefs that are inherently unverifiable and contradictory
1 Prodigies are anecdotes or microstories about transgressions in the natural order of the cosmos. Prodigies
were reported to the Senate, who decided which were genuine and should be recorded.
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to the way we intuitively see the material world. This puzzling finding brings us to a
fundamental question in the relationship between MCI concepts and the supernatural.
How do people come to believe in and commit to these unintuitive ideas?
MCI content should be, on average, less believable than intuitive content because
MCI content violates our intuitions about the world. These intuitions exist based on our
experience of the world, either in our lifetimes or as they have been encoded into our
genes through generations, and they exist because of the benefit they give in accurately
predicting the world.2 From an evolutionary point of view, it is expected that people are
skeptical of claims that defy experience or expectations (Bergstrom et al. 2006; Harris
& Koenig 2006).
Based on these ideas we hypothesize here that MCI content is less believable than
intuitive content and additional mechanisms are required to make MCI content the
center of genuine belief. Still, this question of belief has yet to be empirically explored.
Cultural Learning and Credibility-Enhancing Displays (CREDs)
Thus far, we have articulated two ideas about MCI content and belief: (1) when MCI
content involves ideas we call “religious,” it is not merely represented and remembered,
it contains commitment or belief; (2) MCI content, as a violation of our intuitions about
the world, should be particularly unbelievable—otherwise we would lose much of the
benefit of having these intuitions in the first place. The second observation might seem
self-evident—after all, counterintuitiveness suggests the absence of believability. Yet,
to the extent that this is empirically true, we are left with an apparent paradox: if MCI
content is memorable, but less believable, how do we explain both its prevalence in
religions and the deep faith they can inspire? One answer, we suggest, might be found
in cultural learning mechanisms that can facilitate the spread of beliefs even if they are
intuitively implausible.
Several cultural learning mechanisms are likely to be involved in the transmission of
religious beliefs. Henrich (Henrich 2009) has proposed a mechanism that is relevant to
difficult-to-verify beliefs: credibility-enhancing displays (CRED). The CRED hypoth-
esis suggests that we learn beliefs from others to the extent that these beliefs are backed
up by credible displays. When someone behaves in a way that is credible and consistent
with their beliefs, such as by giving tithes to the church they claim to believe in, or
eating a mushroom they claim is not poisonous, their associated beliefs become more
plausible and more likely to be acquired by observers. Their actions underwrite their
words.
CREDs are actions that a person would be unlikely to engage in unless they truly
believed their expressed conviction. This cultural learning bias helps learners navigate a
world in which others should want to convince them of untrue things for selfish reasons
(e.g., the advertising industry, lawyers, and politicians). The classical example for
religion would be the pairing of verbal statements about beliefs in life after death and
the actions of martyrdom. Martyrdom is powerful as a transmitter of the faith because it
2 Elsewhere we have hypothesized that most religious concepts, and concepts that are labeled as MCI, are
actually supported by core intuitions about the world rather than being violations of those intuitions (Purzycki
& Willard 2015; Willard & Norenzayan 2013).
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shows that—if nothing else—the martyr must have unreservedly held the belief he or
she verbally expressed.
Overview of Experiments
We conducted four experiments to explore these ideas. Experiments 1–3 establish
that counterintuitive representations are less believable than intuitive representa-
tions, even when they are more memorable. We also tested whether individual
differences in trait anthropomorphism—that is, a chronic tendency to apply
human characteristics widely to nonhuman things (Waytz et al. 2010a)—moderates
the memory effect for similar content. We hypothesized that high anthropomorphizers
should show less memory bias for anthropomorphic content then low
anthropomorphizers simply because they find anthropomorphic content less distinc-
tive. Finally, experiment 4 tests the hypothesis that MCI content can become
believable through cultural learning. We assess if witnessing a CRED would
enhance people’s willingness to endorse or believe in science news stories indepen-
dent of MCI content.
Experiments 1–3
In the first three experiments, we address the question of believability of MCI content
across three different types of stimuli. This was done by comparing ratings of believ-
ability for intuitive and counterintuitive content. We also assessed the impact of
individual differences in the tendency to use one particular type of MCI content—
anthropomorphic content—on the memory bias for MCI content. Anthropomorphism
reliably varies across individuals and affects how people interact in the world in
predictable ways (Epley et al. 2008a; Epley et al. 2008b; Waytz et al. 2010a; Waytz
et al. 2010b), and this variation allows us to test the hypothesis that MCI content that is
more expected is less memorable. We used a validated scale of anthropomorphism (the
IDAQ: Waytz et al. 2010a) to assess the willingness to attribute human-like states to
animals, nature, and technology.
Methods
Participants All participants were recruited from a university human subject pool and
given course credit for their participation (Table 1).
Materials Each of the three experiments used a different set of stimuli to assess the
memorability and believability of MCI versus intuitive content. They are as follows:
Exp. 1: Folktales Three different “folktales” were constructed by the experimenters
(see ESM). Each story had three different versions pertaining to each of the categories
(anthropomorphic-MCI, physical-MCI, social-intuitive), for a total of nine stories, all
approximately 200 words in length. The stories were constructed to be easily divisible
into individual “concepts” for coding purposes and so the content type could be
Hum Nat
changed without changing anything else in the story. For the most part, these
concepts were single sentences (e.g., “Jane went for a walk in the woods.”
Participants would be marked as remembering this “concept” if they said anything
about Jane walking in the woods). If sentences contained more than one concept,
they were divided up accordingly. This was done to control for anything idiosyn-
cratic about the stories.
Exp. 2: Museum Story This stimuli was taken from Boyer and Ramble (Boyer &
Ramble 2001). It consists of a short introduction about Mr. Wurg and his trip
to the natural history museum on the planet Zeon 3. The story lists 24 items:
12 objects and 12 people. Of each of these sets of 12 items, 6 were minimally
counterintuitive and 6 were entirely intuitive. All the MCI objects use some
type of animacy and/or a mental trait as their MCI violations rather than the
physical violations used in the previous experiment and should be considered
anthropomorphic in nature (e.g., “Objects that hide when they are scared”;
“Objects that can notice people are staring at them”).
Exp. 3: Science News Stories This stimuli consisted of 12 single-paragraph-long
summaries of news stories. Six of the news stories were intuitive and six had a
minimally counterintuitive violation. Of the minimally counterintuitive stories,
three were real news stories, and three were created by the experimenter
(see ESM). Science news was selected as something that could be presented
as new information that is plausible. This allowed us to assess whether believ-
ability findings from the first two experiments were due to the clear fictional
nature of the stimuli.
After reading all the stimuli, participants were asked to (1) recall them and (2) rate
how believable they thought each story was. This was done with a one-item measure in
experiment 1 (“I believe this story could be true) and a three-item measure for
experiments 2 and 3 (“I believe this item is real”; “It’s plausible this item could exist”;
“I doubt this item is true”; α=0.84). This change was made to make the believability
score more reliable and less prone to error (see Traub & Rowley 1991). Participants in
Table 1 Participants’ demographics, experiments 1–4
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4
N 95 89 99 77
Female 78 (82%) 63 (71.6%) 68 (68.7%) 41 (53%)
Age (sd) 19.25 (1.74) 19.9 (2.6) 20.16 (3.10) 20.38 (1.88)
Ethnicity
Asian 64 (67.4%) 55 (61.9%) 67 (67.7%) 40 (51.9%)
Caucasian 27 (28.4%) 31 (34.5%) 23 (23.2%) 34 (44.2%)
Other 4 (4.2%) 3 (3.6%) 9 (9.1%) 3 (3.9%)
Religious Affiliation
Christian — 41 (46.5%) 41 (41.4%) 34 (44.2%)
Other Religious — 13 (15.1%) 16 (16.1%) 9 (11.6%)
Non-Religious — 34 (38.4%) 42 (42.5%) 34 (44.2%)
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experiment 1 also rated how much they liked each story on a seven-point Likert scale.
The IDAQ was used to assess each participant’s tendency to anthropomorphize (Waytz
et al. 2010a).
Design and Procedures For all experiments, participants came into the lab and
were instructed to complete the experiment alone in a cubicle. They read
stimuli displayed on a computer screen and were told that they would be asked
about it again later, but they were not informed that they would be recalling it.
The order of stories/items was randomized across participants. Participants were
given 5 min to complete a distractor math question and then asked to recall
what they had read by typing it out on the computer. For experiment 1, story
recall was prompted by the main character in each story (i.e., “Recall the story
about Jane”) and they were asked to recall the stories as though they were
writing them out for another person to read. For experiment 2 recall, partici-
pants were asked to recall as many objects and people as possible, and
experiment 3 participants were asked to recall in a single sentence the main
topic of as many stories as they could. After recall each story/item was
displayed and participants rated how much they believed each story/item.
They then completed the anthropomorphism questionnaire.
In experiments 2 and 3, participants were asked to come back for a second
session, one week later. This was done to assess change through time in
memory and belief. Participants were asked to recall the items from the stories
they had read the previous week and then to rate belief again. This was done to
see if either memory or belief changed with a short time interval (see
Norenzayan et al. 2006). Finally, in experiment 3 a behavioral measure was
added. After evaluating belief and memory in the second session, participants
were told that some of the news stories were fake, and that we would give
them $1 US for each story they could correctly identify as real (or not real).
This was done to raise the stakes of reporting belief and to move beyond
simple self-reported measures of belief.
Results
Experiment 1 Stories were divided into sets of single concepts with an associ-
ated concept type (intuitive, anthropomorphic-MCI, physical-MCI), and each
concept was coded as present or absent. Two independent coders coded recall
(κ = 0.93). The total number of recalled concepts was divided by the total
number of concepts and reported as a proportion. 3 We found no significant
difference in the memorability of our three story types, (F2, 281 = 1.96, p= 0.14),
or in how much participants liked each story (F2, 278 = 2.49, p= 0.09). There
was a significant difference in the believability of each category (F1.46,
205.13 = 68.69, p< 0.001; using Greenhouse and Geisser (Greenhouse & Geisser
3 Since each story could be intuitive, anthropomorphic-MCI, or physical-MCI, and story type was random-
ized, the total number of concepts did not differ across content type even though it did differ by story.
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1959) correction for sphericity; see Table 2). Using planned comparisons, we
found that anthropomorphic-MCI and physical-MCI were believed less than
intuitive stories (F1, 282 =136.52, p<0.001). No difference was found in believability
between anthropomorphic and MCI stories (F1, 282=0.09, p=0.76).
This analysis was confirmed using a multilevel regression with random
intercepts and fixed slopes for each individual. We show that a categorical
change from the combined category of anthropomorphic-MCI, physical-MCI is
associated with an average change of −1.75 (95%CI: −2.10 to −1.40;
t90.34 = 10.14, p< 0.001; d=−2.49) points on a seven-point belief scale when
compared with intuitive items, controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, and order.
A second multilevel regression using the same control variables showed no
significant effect of the combined anthropomorphic-MCI, physical-MCI content
on memory (−0.04; 95%CI: −0.08 to 0.01; t92.77 =−1.44, p= 0.15).
We ran an additional set of OLS regressions to examine the relationship
between anthropomorphic tendencies and memory (Table 3). Our results show a
significant negative effect of IDAQ on memory for anthropomorphic-MCI
content and a marginal effect for physical-MCI content. We also found a
negative effect of belief on memory for both anthropomorphic-MCI and
physical-MCI content. No effects were found for intuitive content.
Experiment 2 Recall was recorded as number of individual items recalled in
each category, using the same methods as Boyer and Ramble (Boyer & Ramble
2001). Two independent coders coded recall (κ= 0.91). MCI items were signif-
icantly more memorable after a 5-min delay (M= 3.34, sd = 1.90) than the
intuitive items (M= 2.34, sd= 1.83; t88 = 5.35, p< 0.001, 95%CI: 0.63 to 1.37;
d= 0.57). MCI items were significantly less believable (M= 3.47, sd= 1.27) than
the intuitive items (M= 6.59, sd= 0.61; t88 =−20.51, p< 0.001, 95%CI: −3.43 to
−2.82; d= 2.17).
After a one-week delay, we once again found that MCI items were significantly
more memorable (M=2.20, sd=1.81) than the intuitive items (M=1.61, sd=1.81;
t82=3.10, p=0.002, 95%CI: 0.21 to 0.97; d=0.34) and that MCI items were signifi-
cantly less believable (M=3.17, sd=1.27) than intuitive items (M=6.61, sd=0.60;
t81=−20.80, p<0.001, 95%CI: −3.77 to −3.11; d=2.29).4 There was no change in
believability from time 1 to time 2 for either MCI (t78=0.75, p=0.46) or intuitive
(t78=1.41, p=0.16) items.
To assess the effects of belief and anthropomorphism on memory, we again
conducted a series of OLS regressions (Tables 4). Religious affiliation was
added as an additional control. (Information on affiliation was not collected
in experiment 1.) All of the results are robust with regard to the inclusion or
4 Using a multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts for each individual we can show that these
effects do not change when we control for age, gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. MCI items are
significantly more memorable than intuitive items after 5 min (z = 4.98, p < 0.001; Odds: 1.77, 95%CI: 1.41 to
2.21) and one week (z = 3.51, p < 0.001; Odds: 1.66, 95%CI: 1.25 to 2.21). Belief was similarly modeled.
Belief changed an average of −3.08 (95 % CI −3.39 to −2.77; t81.00 = −19.46, p < 0.001, d = −9.26) points on a
seven-point scale between intuitive items and MCI items after 5 min, and −3.46 (95%CI: −3.60 to −3.32;
t165.40 = −49.53, p < 0.001) after one week.
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exclusion of any of these covariates. Our analysis showed a significant negative
effect of anthropomorphism on both MCI objects and people after the 5 min
delay. There was also a negative effect of anthropomorphism on memory for
intuitive people items. Recall at one week showed a marginal negative effect of
anthropomorphism on MCI objects, but no other effects. The time 2 effects use
the anthropomorphism measure taken at time 1. We did not replicate the effect
of belief reducing memory found in experiment 1.
Experiment 3 Recall was coded as a yes or no for each story. Participants were
coded “yes” if they remembered the main point of the news story (e.g., “A
story about teleporting objects,” “A story about windows that produce solar
power”). Memory was coded by two independent coders (κ = 0.79). Mean
differences in memory between MCI stories (M= 3.05, sd= 1.38) and intuitive
stories (M= 2.85 sd= 1.19) were not significant at conventional levels after a 5-
min delay (t95 = 1.35, p= 0.18, 95%CI; −0.09 to 0.49; d= 0.19). Memorability
was marginally different between MCI (M= 2.44, sd= 1.48) and intuitive stories
(M= 2.12, sd= 1.23) after 1 week (t83 = 1.87, p= 0.07, 95%CI: −0.02 to 0.66;
d= 0.27). Nevertheless, a multilevel model approach with random intercepts for





Belief −0.05 (0.02)* −0.22 −0.46 −0.06
IDAQ −0.03 (0.01)* −0.25 −0.45 −0.05
Physical-MCI
Belief −0.04 (0.02)* −0.25 −0.47 −0.04
IDAQ −0.02 (0.01)† −0.19 −0.41 0.02
Social-Intuitive
Belief 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 −0.22 0.22
IDAQ −0.01 (0.02) −0.09 −0.31 0.14
Controls: age, gender, ethnicity, and order effects
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05
Table 2 Means (and sd) of dependent variables for each story type
Memory Liking Belief
Social-Intuitive 0.41 (0.21) 3.59 (1.51) 3.32 (1.62)
Anthropomorphic 0.38 (0.19) 3.96 (1.52) 1.57 (0.92)
MCI (physical) 0.36 (0.16) 3.82 (1.55) 1.52 (0.95)
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each individual and controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation,
and fake stories estimates that MCI content (relative to intuitive content)
increases the odds of recall by 41% (z= 2.33, p= 0.02; Odds: 1.41, 95%CI:
1.06 to 1.89) after 5 min. At one week the odds of recall increase by 79%
(z= 3.64, p< 0.001; Odds: 1.79, 95%CI: 1.31 to 2.46).
Consistent with the previous experiments, MCI stories were significantly less
believable (M= 3.23, sd= 1.03) than intuitive stories (M= 4.78, sd= 1.18 after
5 min; t95 =−16.54, p< 0.001, 95%CI: −1.74 to −1.37; d=−1.67). Believability
remained significantly lower for MCI (M= 3.25, sd= 1.04) than for intuitive
items (M= 4.75, sd= 1.23) at one week (t83 = 14.65, p< 0.001, 95%CI: 1.29 to





Belief 0.19 (0.09)* 0.24 0.01 0.47
IDAQ −0.23 (0.09)** −0.31 −0.54 −0.08
MCI people
Belief 0.03 (0.09) 0.04 −0.19 0.27
IDAQ −0.18 (0.08)* −0.26 −0.49 −0.03
Intuitive objects
Belief 0.01 (0.26) 0.01 −0.27 0.28
IDAQ −0.10 (0.08) −0.15 −0.39 0.09
Intuitive people
Belief 0.15 (0.21) 0.09 −0.15 0.32
IDAQ −0.19 (0.08)* −0.26 −0.48 −0.05
1 week
MCI objects
Belief 0.06 (0.09) 0.08 −0.17 0.33
IDAQ −0.14 (0.08)† −0.23 −0.48 0.03
MCI people
Belief −0.03 (0.10) −0.04 −0.31 0.23
IDAQ 0.03 (0.08) 0.04 −0.22 0.31
Intuitive objects
Belief 0.23 (0.23) 0.13 −0.14 0.40
IDAQ −0.03 (0.08) −0.13 −0.29 0.21
Intuitive people
Belief 0.12 (0.23) 0.07 −0.22 0.36
IDAQ −0.06 (0.07) −0.11 −0.36 0.14
Controls: age, gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliation
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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1.70; d=−1.58). There was no change in believability between time 1 and time
2 for either MCI (t82 = 0.75, p= 0.46) or intuitive items (t82 = 1.41, p= 0.16).
5
The fake MCI stories were more believable than the real MCI stories, discrediting
the hypothesis that participants were simply identifying untrue stories in their believ-
ability estimates (Fake: M= 3.46, sd= 1.17; Real: M= 2.99, sd= 1.15; t98 = 4.79,
p<0.001; 95%CI: 0.30 to 0.71; d=0.48).
We used regression analyses to assess the effect of IDAQ and belief on
memory (Table 5). Although we found a similar pattern for anthropomorphism’s
relationship to memory at 5 min, the effect was significant only for the second
session.
The behavioral money task resulted in comparable effects to our believability
scores, with nearly twice as much cash bet on intuitive stories (money per
story: M= $0.61, sd= 0.25; t82 = 6.73, p< 0.001) than MCI stories (money per
story: M = $0.37, sd = 0.24; 95%CI: −0.32 to −0.17; d = 0.71). On average,
participants wagered a total of $1.47 less (95%CI: −1.91 to −1.04) on MCI
stories than on intuitive stories. Money bet on both MCI and intuitive items
were positively correlated with previous belief measures, serving as a behav-
ioral validation of the latter (MCI: r= 0.46, t79 = 4.56, p< 0.001, 95%CI: 0.26 to
0.61; INT: r= 0.59, t79 = 6.48, p< 0.001, 95%CI: 0.43 to 0.72).





Belief 0.01 (0.03) 0.03 −0.19 0.26
IDAQ −0.02 (0.02) −0.16 −0.42 0.26
Intuitive
Belief −0.03 (0.02) −0.14 −0.34 0.07
IDAQ −0.02 (0.02) −0.16 −0.39 0.09
1 week
MCI
Belief 0.04 (0.03) 0.17 −0.05 0.39
IDAQ −0.05 (0.02)* −0.26 −0.48 −0.04
Intuitive
Belief 0.02 (0.03) 0.08 −0.15 0.32
IDAQ −0.02 (0.02) −0.13 −0.37 0.11
*p < 0.05. Controls: age, gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliation
5 Using a multilevel model with random intercepts for each individual, belief is associated with a change of
−1.59 (95%CI: −1.67 to −1.39; t105.29 = −15.65; p < 0.001) points on a seven-point scale when comparing
MCI and intuitive stories after 5 min, and an average of −1.58 (95%CI: −1.85 to −1.32; t118.70 = 11.77,
p < 0.001) points on seven-point scale after 1 week.
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Discussion
We did not find a memory effect for MCI content in the first experiment, but we did
find an effect in experiments 2 and 3. The memory bias in experiment 1 may have been
washed out by the other information presented in these stories (Gonce et al. 2006; Upal
et al. 2007), such as social information (Mesoudi et al. 2006), or by the narrative
structure itself (e.g., Brewer 1985; Ericsson & Kintsch 1995; Rubin 1995). The
significance of the memory effect in experiment 3 was dependent on the statistical
method used. This makes sense, given that the memory effect is small to moderate
(5 min: d=0.19; 1 week: d=0.27), and our sample size lacked the power to reliably
detect it based on a mean difference t test. The memory effect was the most robust in
experiment 2 and was similar in magnitude to the effect found by Boyer and Ramble
(effect after 5 min: d=0.57; Boyer and Ramble’s experiment 1; d=0.68, estimated
from F test, n=18). Together, these effects suggest that a memory bias is present but is
sensitive to contextual changes.
As predicted, trait anthropomorphism had a negative effect on memory for
anthropomorphic content across all three experiments, but the effect varied in
magnitude and was less consistent across the two-session experiments. The
effect was strongest in experiment 1 looking at anthropomorphic-MCI content
(β=−0.25), but still marginally present for physical-MCI stories (β=−0.19). In
experiment 2, an effect for both MCI objects and people, and a marginal effect
on MCI object recall after 1 week, was found. Since all of these “objects”
contain anthropomorphic violations, the larger effect for objects is consistent
with the hypothesis. In experiment 3 the effect was only present in the second
session. This may be due to the stimuli itself; the MCI content in these stories
was not limited to specifically anthropomorphic information. Given the moder-
ate size of this effect in the prior two experiments, it should be expected to be
nonsignificant some of the time in samples of this size.
Interestingly, we also found a negative effect of anthropomorphism on memory for
the intuitive people stimuli in experiment 2. This could be a statistical fluke, or it could
represent a more general trend of the impact of anthropomorphism on memory. Though
this seems unlikely and the mechanism remains unclear, there is a negative, though
nonsignificant, impact of anthropomorphism on memory for intuitive content in studies
1 and 3 as well. Regardless, the effect of trait anthropomorphism on memory for
anthropomorphic content is a larger and more robust effect. This effect suggests that
how much we expect the world to behave according to these ontological categories can
be different across individuals, and this difference can translate into individual differ-
ences in the effect of anthropomorphic content on memory.
The effects of MCI content on belief were unambiguous. Across all three experi-
ments, MCI content was found much less believable than intuitive content (d values
between −1.58 and −2.49). These effects did not decline after a one-week interval,
suggesting that, at least in the short term, this effect does not change with time. It could
be argued that repeated exposure, rather than just time, could lead to increased belief
(e.g., Zaragoza & Mitchell 1996). Though we did not test this directly, by the time the
belief measure was taken for the second time in experiments 2 and 3, participants had
read the items three times and recalled them twice. This repeat exposure did not affect
their willingness to believe in these items.
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The monetary measure in study 3 replicated the belief findings (d=−0.71), indicat-
ing that people were willing to systematically bet against the reality of MCI stories.
Even when rewarded for correct answers, people persistently believed that the intuitive
stories were more likely to be true than MCI ones.
Experiment 4
Experiments 1–3 showed that people found MCI content less believable than
intuitive content. When we consider the religious content the MCI hypothesis
proposes to explain, this lack of belief becomes a problem. Religious ideas are
ideas people believe in. If religious ideas include MCI content, then people
must come to believe in this type of content somehow. A partial solution to this
puzzle is that belief—particularly counterintuitive belief—is sustained by a
variety of cultural learning mechanisms (Atran & Henrich 2010; Gervais
et al. 2011; Henrich 2009; Norenzayan 2013). The theoretical problem of belief
(why people come to believe in some MCI concepts and not others) has been
widely claimed, but never empirically shown. In the first three experiments, we
show that MCI content is found to be highly unbelievable. At the same time,
we know that people do come to believe in this and other types of unbelievable
content. This problem of belief is not insurmountable, and we propose it is
frequently and easily overcome with non-content-based cultural learning (i.e.,
learning based on social transmission and not based on the content of the idea
itself).
In our fourth experiment, we investigated one possible cultural learning bias,
CREDs (Henrich 2009), which might explain how MCI content becomes
believable through the observation of another person’s behavior. Participants
were given news stories from the previous experiment, as well as $5 in dollar
coins to bet on the truth of stories. Their money was doubled on correct bets
and lost on incorrect bets. Any money they did not bet was theirs to keep. A
confederate disguised as another participant also completed the experiment at
the same time as the participant and was observable by the participant. The
confederate verbally endorsed either the MCI stories or the intuitive stories and
either put money down on the stories he endorsed (the CRED) or put no
money down at all (no CRED). We hypothesized that participants who witness
an endorsement combined with a CRED would be more likely to endorse a
given story themselves by betting money on it.
Methods
For the participants, see Table 1.
Materials The stimuli consisted of 10 of the 12 stories from experiment 3. One
MCI story and one intuitive story were removed from the set to make five
stories of each type. This was done to make the experiment shorter so the
confederate could move from one room to another without risking bumping into
the next participant.
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Design and Procedures Participants came into the lab and were given the news
stories to read in a random order. They rated their belief in each story with the
same three questions used in experiments 2 and 3. The anthropomorphism scale
was excluded because memory was not theoretically relevant to this task since
memory was not being assessed.
Participants were brought into a room with a confederate posing as a second
participant. Both people were given five $1 coins and told to bet the money on
any story they believed was a true story. If their belief was correct, the money
would be doubled, if they were incorrect, they would lose the money. They
were instructed to discuss their decisions with one another. The confederate
either bet all of his money, $1 per story, on the MCI or the intuitive stories
(CRED) or bet no money (no-CRED). In both the CRED and verbal (no-
CRED) conditions he verbally endorsed one set of stories (MCI or intuitive)
over the other. The same statements of endorsement were used in both the
CRED and no-CRED conditions (see ESM). In the CRED condition, the
confederate additionally stated that he would put a dollar down for each of
relevant stories. In the verbal (no-CRED) condition, no comment was made
about money and the confederate did not write on the paper at all. The
confederate’s comments about each story were scripted, but he was allowed
to make unscripted small talk if it wasn’t about the story. The confederate was
further instructed to disagree with the participant if the participant expressed a
differing option. For any disagreement that was not covered by the script, the
confederate was instructed to disagree, but not to add any additional informa-
tion about the content. For example, if the participant said they thought an
intuitive story was correct in the MCI condition, the confederate would simply
say something such as “it just doesn’t sound right to me” or “it seems untrue.”
Though the confederate and the participant were in the same room, the con-
federate could not see what stories the participant marked. This interaction was
cut off after 2 min. The participant and the confederate were separated and the
participant was asked to rate the confederate on likability, trust, reliability, and
how much they agree with his opinions. Suspicion about the confederate and
the purpose of the experiment was probed with a funneled debriefing. Eight
participants were removed because of their suspicion.
Results
The initial pre-betting ratings of belief replicated the belief findings from the
previous experiments. Participants rated the MCI stories as less believable
(M=3.18, sd=1.10) than the intuitive stories (M=4.66, sd=0.99; t60 =−9.95,
p<0.001, 95%CI: −1.76 to −1.17; d=−1.22). Across the whole sample we found
a significant difference between the money bet on MCI stories (M= $0.98,
sd=1.25) and that bet on intuitive stories (money per story: M=$1.84, sd=1.71;
t60=−3.08, p=0.003, 95%CI: −1.41 to −0.30; d=0.32). Critically, we found that
when the betting was credibly displayed, the participants bet more money across
all stories (M=$3.65, sd=1.67) than when it was not displayed (M=$1.96,
sd=2.04; Welch’s t58.05 = 3.58, p<0.001, 95%CI: $0.74 to $2.63; d=0.98).
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To assess if the credible display affected bets overall, or only items that were
bet on, we regressed the four conditions as dummy codes on the amount of
money placed on each story type individually. If the CRED affected betting
overall, then both CREDs conditions should be significant for both story types.
If the CRED affected only the stories to which the CRED was directed, we
should see type-specific effects (i.e., CRED for MCI should positively affect
the money placed on MCI stories, but not the money placed on intuitive
stories; Table 6). When CREDs were targeted on MCI items, participants
increased the amount of money they placed on MCI stories but not intuitive
stories. When CREDs were targeted on intuitive items, participants increased
the amount of money placed on intuitive stories but not MCI stories.
We analyzed the data a second time using a multilevel logistic regression
with random intercepts and slopes for each individual. This allows us to
compare the items that were endorsed with those that were not endorsed as
well as whether the endorsement was verbal or involved a CRED. The random
intercepts correct the standard errors for the lack of independence of our data
points. We found a main effect of CRED, increasing the odds of betting by an
average of 6.68, but not of verbal endorsement (Table 7). This effect is
controlling for the significant effect of prior belief on betting. There was no
significant interaction between CRED and story type (MCI) and a marginal
interaction effect of verbal endorsement of MCI stories in our sample (Fig. 1).




Intercept −0.37 (1.52) 0.05 −0.56 0.65
Verbal Intuitive −0.60 (0.36) −0.48 −1.06 0.10
CRED Intuitive −0.59 (0.36) −0.47 −1.05 0.11
CRED MCI 1.30 (0.37)*** 1.04 0.45 1.63
Belief MCI 0.25 (0.12)* 0.22 0.01 0.42
Money on Intuition
Intercept −0.75 (2.58) −0.40 −1.07 0.27
Verbal MCI 0.04 (0.55) 0.02 −0.63 0.67
CRED Intuition 1.94 (0.55)*** 1.13 0.48 1.78
CRED MCI 0.26 (0.56) 0.15 −0.51 0.82
Belief Intuition 0.42 (0.21) 0.26 −0.05 0.44
All DV ratings between $0 and $5. Categorical variables were not standardized, leading to non-zero intercepts
for β. These betas can be interpreted as the average standard deviation change in the dependent variable for
each category compared to the intercept. The unstandardized betas are the average change in dollars. Controls:
age, gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliation
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001, n = 62
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We also found a significant positive effect of the CRED manipulation on
how much the participant thought the confederate was trustworthy and reliable,
as well as a marginal effect on liking (Table 8). There was a negative effect of
endorsing MCI stories on the agreement rating.
Table 7 Multilevel logistic regression using condition to predict bets
B(SE) Odds 95%CI
Lower Upper
Place Bet (yes = 1)
Intercept −4.68 (0.67)*** 0.01 0.00 0.03
CRED 1.90 (0.67)** 6.68 1.80 24.68
Verbal −1.31 (0.83) 0.27 0.05 1.36
MCI −0.45 (0.51) 0.63 0.23 1.73
Belief 0.74 (0.11)*** 2.10 1.67 2.62
CRED*MCI −0.13 (0.87) 0.88 0.51 2.33
Verbal*MCI 2.05 (1.06)† 7.77 0.97 62.35
Controls: age (centered at mean) and gender. Ethnicity and religious affiliation were not included in the model
because the model failed to converge with the addition of these variables
Number Obs: 630, groups (Subject): 63
†p < 0.10, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Fig. 1 Money bet on news stories. The None category represents a CRED or verbal endorsement of the
opposite category (e.g., if MCI stories had no endorsment, it was because the intuitive stories were being
endorsed). The drop from Verbal to None in MCI stories reflects the fact that endorsing intuitive stories
decreased the offers on MCI stories. The opposite was not the case (see Table 6). Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals of the means
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Discussion
The CRED performed by the confederate—that is, betting money in accordance
with their opinions—increased the odds by nearly sevenfold that the participant
would bet on the same stories. Participants tended to place their money on the
stories that the confederate bet on rather than just picking stories at random, or
picking the stories they had previously rated as believable. When participants
saw the confederate bet on MCI stories, those stories were endorsed at a higher
rate than intuitive stories with only verbal endorsement. Based on the pre-
manipulation ratings of belief, there does not seem to be much ambiguity in
which stories participants thought were false. This experiment supports the idea
that witnessing a behavior that is consistent with a model’s expressed beliefs
increases the likelihood of endorsing those beliefs. In other words, beliefs that
are backed up by CREDs can be culturally contagious.
Also consistent with the hypothesis, the CRED manipulation also affected
the participants’ opinions of the confederate. When the confederate acted in
accordance with his opinions, the participants saw him as more trustworthy
(β = 0.68), more reliable (β = 0.51), and marginally more likable (β= 0.50),
suggesting that acting according to one’s beliefs may lead to reputational
benefits as well as spread behaviors and potentially beliefs.
Within the betting scenario, there was no significant interaction between
CRED and story type. The CRED manipulation was effective for both types
of information. This is consistent with the theory, which suggests that all types
of information should be susceptible to social and cultural learning cues (see
Henrich 2009; Henrich & McElreath 2003). Nevertheless, the CRED effect on
MCI content is of particular interest because it could help resolve the apparent




CRED 0.58 (0.31)† 0.50 −0.03 1.03
MCI −0.31 (0.32) −0.27 −0.81 0.28
Trust
CRED 0.87 (0.30)** 0.68 0.21 1.15
MCI −0.26 (0.31) −0.21 −0.69 0.27
Reliable
CRED 0.73 (0.34)* 0.51 0.03 0.98
MCI −0.29 (0.34) −0.20 −0.68 0.27
Agree with
CRED 0.50 (0.35) 0.32 −0.13 0.77
MCI −1.40 (0.36)*** −0.89 −1.35 −0.43
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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paradox that MCI content is commonly found in religious traditions even
though it may initially be less believable.
This is just a first step in testing a complex set of processes, with many
open questions. This experiment offers some insight into the plausibility of
cultural learning and social influence as a source of belief in supernatural
concepts. Several other social learning mechanisms could work as additions
to, or in the place of, CREDs. Still, this research suggests CREDs as one
plausible candidate to aid in the transmission of religious practices and beliefs.
This area of research is yet to be thoroughly explored in the cognitive science
of religion.
General Discussion
Evidence from these experiments, and previous research, suggests that the
memory effect of MCI content is present but fragile, and boundary conditions
need to be identified (see Purzycki & Willard 2015). For example, changes in
context seem to be enough to make the effect disappear (see Gonce et al. 2006;
Upal et al. 2007). This and other research suggests that if an MCI memory bias
exists, then further work needs to be done in exploring the boundaries of this
bias. Under what conditions is this bias robust, and under what conditions is it
not?
One possible boundary explored in this paper is the effect of the tendency to
habitually anthropomorphize on the memory for anthropomorphic MCI content.
We surmise that this decrease is due to the lack of distinctiveness of this type
of MCI content to people who see this type of explanation everywhere. If one
believes the ocean is conscious, and that one’s computer occasionally gets mad
at them, they may not be surprised when this type of anthropomorphic thinking
is applied to other phenomena.
There are two potential explanations. One is a schema view of MCI content
advanced by Upal (Upal 2010) and Purzycki (Purzycki 2010), rather than the
original ontological category view expressed by others (Atran & Norenzayan
2004a; Boyer 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001). If this is the case, we should
expect the memory effect of MCI content to disappear and these concepts to
become familiar. When we first come across these concepts, they seem surpris-
ing and therefore are memorable, but as we become familiar with them they are
integrated into certain schemas we have of the world. They become common-
place, and the memory advantage disappears. A declining memory advantage
such as this cannot explain religions’ spread through time, but only why they
might initially spread. A separate mechanism would have to explain why they
persist. Second is the view that anthropomorphism is a special case, and other
types of ontological violations, governed by core knowledge domains, are not
as easily updated. Further work is needed to assess this possibility.
Given the general negative trend for anthropomorphism on memory for all
content types, perhaps some of the effects we are seeing are due to some other
cognitive capacity related to both increased anthropomorphism and decreased
memory. Even if this is the case, it would not explain the type-specific
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decreases we see in these experiments. If a general effect was entirely respon-
sible for these affects, there should be no differences across conditions.
In all of these experiments, clearly people do not readily believe MCI
concepts. Though the idea that counterintuitive content is hard to believe may
be an uncontroversial claim, the religious phenomena that the MCI hypothesis
proposes to explain entail some degree of belief or commitment—otherwise the
hypothesis cannot be about religious belief. It could be argued that the lack of
belief we found comes from our sample, which is made up entirely of educated
Westerners (see Henrich et al. 2010). Perhaps people in other places and times,
without Western influence and education, or those not exposed to Abrahamic
religions, would not show as much skepticism toward MCI items. This conjec-
ture runs counter to one of the foundational premises of the MCI hypothesis—
namely, that these violated categories are rooted in reliably developing, core
intuitions. Further, it seems unlikely that people in other places and times were
less, rather than more, familiar with counterintuitive claims about the world
than we are in the West today.
We also found the MCI content was consistently deemed less believable than
intuitive content. This relationship between MCI content and belief illustrates
three points: (1) MCI items are seen as more supernatural than intuitive items
(see Atran & Norenzayan 2004b; Pyysiäinen et al. 2003); (2) MCI items are
less believable than intuitive items; and (3) supernatural concepts are believed
in all around the world. For all of these to be true, we need to explain how
people come to believe in the unbelievable that is separate from memorability.
Given the existence of complex cultures and ritual practices to support religious
beliefs, multiple processes are likely to contribute to belief. One process we
found evidence for is that of credible displays. These displays convey the
authenticity of beliefs to others and can increase the likelihood that witnesses
adopt similar practices and beliefs (Henrich 2009).
There are many other cultural learning mechanisms through which people
transmit information (see Henrich & Boyd 1998; Henrich & Gil-White 2001;
Henrich & McElreath 2003). We used CREDs here because it is a learning
mechanism proposed to deal specifically with the type of unverifiable informa-
tion we find in religious beliefs. Our findings support CREDs as a possible
candidate for belief transmission. There is much more to be done to understand
the role of CREDs and other cultural learning mechanisms in religious and
other cultural beliefs. The study presented here is in no way meant to be a
conclusive test in regard to the robustness of CREDs, but rather a preliminary
demonstration that social cues can influence people’s belief in the implausible.
Conclusion
MCI content is a prominent feature of religious beliefs, but more work needs to
be done to explain the boundaries and conditions of this phenomenon. Showing
a memory bias solves only a small part of this issue, especially if this memory
effect is fragile and affected by expectations. If belief is illusive for MCI
content, we require a strong mechanism to explain how this content becomes
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the center of belief systems. We demonstrate CREDs to be one such mecha-
nism. Our findings suggest that cultural learning and social influence are an
important part of how we come to accept counterintuitive ideas as true. These
types of influences on the belief in supernatural agents and concepts require
more attention and research if we wish to understand religions and their role in
human psychology and behavior.
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